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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
* * * * * * * * 
THE MOUNTAIN STATES 
TELEPHONE & TELEGRAPH 
COMPANY, REPLY BRIEF 
Appellant, Case No. 16000 
v. 
SALT LAKE CITY, 
Respondent. 
* * * * * * * * 
I. ISSUES DEALT WITH IN THIS BRIEF 
Appellant hereby submits the following brief with 
respect to the issues of res judicata and collateral estoppel. 
These issues were raised by respondent in its brief, and were 
not dealt with in appellant's initial brief in this matter. 
II. ARGUMENT 
1. THIS SUIT IS NOT BARRED BY RES JUDICATA 
Although respondent's argument is less than clear 
in specifying the basis for its contention that res judicata 
is applicable to this action, its argument seems to infer 
that it relies on that species of res judicata outlined in 
§48 Restatement, Judgments, (1942), which is usually referred 
to as "bar." This doctrine, however, bars suit only as to 
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"the original cause of action." The 1971 case relied on 
by respondent, the "original cause of action" with respect 
to the res judicata issue in this action, involved taxes 
imposed prior to October, 1971 (R. - 182, 445). The pre-
sent suit deals with taxes imposed under a different en-
actment than the one involved in the 1971 litigation 
(R. 172), and accrued during 1977, 1978, and 1979. It is 
universally held that in tax litigation res judicata, in 
its Restatement §48 meaning, has no application in a suit 
challenging the propriety of a tax obligation accrued in 
tax periods subsequent to those at issue in the original 
litigation. The leading case on this point is Commissioner 
v. Sunnen, 333 U.S. 591, 68 S. Ct. 715 (1948). In the years 
following the Sunnen decision, its holding has been followed 
by every state and federal court which has considered the 
issue.l/ 
The holding of these cases also disposes of 
respondent's argument that this Court should hold that 
issues raised by this action are barred because they 
1/ Because of the large number of state and federal 
JUrisdictions which have followed the Sunnen holding, 
those citations are set forth in Appendix I to this 
Reply Brief. 
-2-
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
could have been litigated in the 1971 suits. In addition 
to the obvious factual impossibility of litigating the 
question of the City's disproportionate application and 
enforcement of the tax at issue in 1971 because the facts 
on which those allegations are predicated did not come 
into existence until 1974, the rule of these cases disposes 
of this argument. These cases hold that in tax litigation, 
res judicata in the sense of bar is not applicable at all 
in litigation involving subsequent tax periods; and res 
judicata, meaning collateral estoppel, is available only 
as to issues actually tried and adjudicated in the prior 
litigation. See also Restatement, Judgments §68 (1942). 
2. THIS SUIT IS NOT BARRED BY COLLATERAL 
ESTOPPEL. 
Respondent argues in its brief that a rule which 
it calls "collateral judgment estoppel" bars this suit, 
citing certain sections of American Jurisprudence 2d, but 
disclaiming knowledge of any Utah cases in point. Both the 
language of the authority quoted in respondent's brief and 
the Utah case of McFarland's Estate v. Holt, 18 U.2d 127, 
417 P.2d 244 (1966) show that in order for a party to be 
estopped under the doctrine asserted by respondent, that 
party must have: 
1. prevailed on the issue in question in 
-3-
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some prior litigation; and 
2. must assert, in the subsequent 
suit, a position inconsistent with the 
resolution of that issue which it ob-
tained in the earlier litigation. 
In order for this doctrine to apply to this appeal, 
appellant would have to have prevailed in the 1971 litigation. 
Appellant did not prevail in the 1971 litigation. Appellant's 
present position on the constutionality of its taxation by 
the City would also have to be inconsistent with its position 
in that litigation. Appellant's position on that issue is 
consistent with the position it took in the 1971 litigation. 
At various points in its argument, respondent argues 
or infers that it is somehow entitled to have this Court in-
sulate its allegedly discriminatory taxation from judicial 
review by virtue of one or more aspects of the past history 
of its taxation of appellant. 
It argues that the existence of its franchise agree-
ment and the benefits received by appellant under that agree-
ment insulate its subsequent taxation. This Court held in 
Mountain States Telephone & Telegraph Co. v. Ogden City, 26 
Utah 2d 190, 487 P.2d 849 (1971), that Utah cities have no 
power to enter into any franchise agreement which involves, 
-4-
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or intrudes upon, the City's separate power to tax pur-
suant to §10-8-80 UTAH CODE ANN. That opinion specifically 
ruled invalid so much of the franchise agreement as pur-
ported to deal with any issues having to do with the City's 
imposition of revenue taxes. The tax imposition challenged 
by the present suit consists of revenue taxes, and whatever 
benefits may have been conferred by the remaining provisions 
of the franchise agreement have no bearing on appellant's 
right to bring this litigation. 
Respondent also argues that it has somehow demon-
strated reliance of such a nature that it should not be 
required to defend the validity of the tax at issue. Relying 
on Hanson v. Beehive Security Company, 14 Utah 2d 157, 380 
P.2d 66 (1963), Salt Lake City argues that it is an innocent 
party to the tax transaction challenged here because it 
" .•. has relied on the actions of the plaintiff and the deci-
sion of the Utah Supreme Court in funding its municipal opera-
tions." (Respondent's Brief at 46.) This is apparently an 
argument for an estoppel predicated on some conduct independent 
of any prior adjudication, because Beehive Security, the au-
thority cited for this contention, involved the construction 
of a deed and raised no issue as to the preclusive effect of 
a prior judgment. Respondent seems to claim that as long as 
its representatives thought their tax increases were valid 
-5-
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under the prior rulings of this Court, they should be 
excused, as a matter of law, from having to defend the 
legality of those taxes. This, however, is an argument 
predicated on a mistake in law, and in Utah a mistake 
in law gives rise to no right to legal or equitable 
relief. Starley v. Deseret Fords Corp., 93 Utah 577, 
74 P.2d 122 (1938); Andrus v. Blazzard, 23 Utah 233, 
63 P. 888 (1901). 
More fundamentally, respondent cannot succeed 
on this appeal with any argument predicated on estoppel. 
Utah has a statute, §59-11-11 UTAH CODE ANN., which 
specifies that action which a taxpayer must take in 
order to perfect the right to seek judicial review of 
taxation of the type at issue here. Payment of a tax 
under protest, as was done in this case, gives notice to 
the taxing entity that the propriety of the tax is in 
dispute. Peterson v. Bountiful City, 25 Utah 2d 126, 
477 P.2d 153 (1970). The procedure prescribed by 
§59-11-11 is Utah's exclusive remedy by which the right 
to judicial review may be obtained as to the legality of 
the type of taxes challenged in this suit. Pacific Inter-
mountain Express Company v. State Tax Commission, 7 Utah 
2d 15, 316 P.2d 549 (1957); Shea v. State Tax Commission 
-6-
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101 Utah 209, 120 P.2d 274 (1941). Where the taxpayer 
has followed a statutory procedure which is the exclusive 
remedy by which judicial review of the propriety of a tax 
may be obtained, estoppel is not available to the taxing 
entity to bar the taxpayer's suit. Oklahoma Tax Commis-
sion v. McAfee, 421 P.2d 602 (Okla. 1969). 
All of respondent's arguments with respect to 
collateral estoppel ignore the fact that appellant now 
has competition in a major part of its business, where 
it had no competition at the time of the 1971 litigation. 
As was more fully discussed in appellant's brief, pp. S-9, 
this competition reflects a drastic change which has oc-
curred in appellant's legal status as the result of the 
Interconnect cases. 
A change in the law upon which the determination 
of an issue hinges renders collateral estoppel inapplicable 
to a subsequent suit in which that issue is raised. The 
leading case on this point is State Farm Insurance Co. v. 
Duel, 324 U.S. 154, 162, 65 s. Ct. 573 (1945) and the ap-
plication of the rule of that case to tax litigation in-
distinguishable from the present appeal is illustrated by 
u.s. v. Texaco, 579 F.2d 614, decided by the u.s. Court of 
Claims in 1978. In that case the plaintiff taxpayer challenged 
the legality of certain taxes assessed for its 1957 tax year. 
-7-
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The legality of these same taxes had previously been 
litigated for the plaintiff's tax years 1946 to 1953 
inclusive. The plaintiff claimed that the decision as 
to the legality of the 1946-53 taxes collaterally es-
topped any suit for a contrary ajudication as to the 
1957 taxes, The court noted that a Supreme Court deci-
sion rendered between the two suits had changed the law 
which controlled the main issue in dispute; and held 
collateral estoppel inapplicable, stating: 
* * * where the situation is vitally 
altered between the time of the first 
judgment and the second, the prior 
determination is not conclusive, * * * 
a judicial declaration intervening be-
tween the two proceedings may so change 
the legal atmosphere as to render the 
rule of collateral estoppel inappli-
cable * * * 
579 F.2d at 616 
As courts have noted repeatedly, "collateral 
estoppel is not meant to create vested rights in decisions 
that have become obsolete or erroneous with time, thereby 
causing inequities among taxpayers." CBN Corp. v. U.S., 
364 F.2d 393 at 396 (Ct. Claims 1966). As the Fifth 
Circuit noted in Moch v. East Baton Rouge, 548 F.2d 594 
at 598 (1977), the application of collateral estoppel to 
prevent judicial review of government practices which 
-8-
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haveallegedly become impermissible because of changes 
in the controlling law would allow "to continue ad 
infinitum a constitutionally infirm system outlawed 
everywhere else." 
In a case where its previous rulings on the 
constitutionality of state support of certain private 
schools had been rendered untenable by intervening u. s. 
Supreme Court decisions, the U. s. District Court in 
Virginia said: 
[The intervening Supreme Court deci-
sions were] a substantial change in the 
law and ended further viability of our 
decision. Now to continue its efficacy 
would be unjust to those initially and 
now affected by that order. 
Again, when as here private litiga-
tion has extensive implications of 
public import, the rule of res judicata 
or estoppel is not allowed to stultify 
reassessment of the prior decision. 
The public interest supersedes the pri-
vate interest. 
Griffin v. State Board of Education, 296 F. Supp. 1178 
at 1182 (E. D. Va. 1969); see also Whitcomb v. Chavis, 
403 u. s. 121, 91 S. Ct. 1858 (1971); Dore v. Kleppe, 
522 F. 2d 1369 at 1374-75 (5th Cir. 1975). 
In U. s. v. General Electric Co., 358 F. Supp. 
731 (S.D.N.Y. 1973), the defendant in an anti-trust 9uit 
attempted to defend on the grounds that those aspects of 
-9-
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its marketing system which the government sought to 
challenge had been successfully defended in previous 
litigation. The opinion shows that the company's 
marketing system was not significantly different from 
the system which had been at issue in the prior litiga-
tion. The company claimed that it had relied on the 
earlier decisions in planning its marketing system and 
was, therefore, entitled to have its practices insulated 
from review by collateral estoppel. The court responded 
to the reliance argument: 
" ... But this is not a reason for hold-
ing the system is still valid. I see 
no basis for a finding that because 
G. E. has enjoyed a preferred position 
under the antitrust laws for many years, 
its immunity should be made virtually 
perpetual." 
358 F. Supp. at 742. 
It is significant to note that the respondent concedes 
that it takes the position in this appeal that it is 
entitled to the same perpetual immunity from judicial 
review which was denied in the General Electric case. 
Respondent's brief says: "The Company forever barred 
[sic] from raising these issues against the City again." 
(Respondent's brief at 45). 
-10-
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State courts, as well as federal courts, have 
held that collateral estoppel is unavailable where there 
has been an intervening change in the controlling law. 
Melenderes v. City of Los Angeles, 115 Cal. Rptr. 409 at 
417 (Ct. App. 1974); Hialeah Race Course v. Gulfstream 
Park Racing Assn., 210 So.2d 750 (Fla. 1968); Manilow v. 
City of Miami Beach, 213 So.2d 589 (Fla. 1968); Smith v. 
Allstate Insurance Co., 150 S.E.2d 354 (Ga. 1966). 
This Court has also recognized that collateral 
estoppel is unavailable after a change in the controlling 
law. Sprague v. Broyles Bros. Drilling, 4 Utah 2d 344, 
294 P.2d 689 (1956); State v. California Packing Corp., 
105 Utah 191, 145 P.2d 784 (1944). None of the cases 
cited by respondent at pages 36-38 of its brief involved 
the application of either res judicata or collateral es-
toppel following a change in controlling law. The same 
statement is true of McCarthy v. State, 1 Utah 2d 205, 
265 P.2d 387 (1953) cited at pages 43-45 of respondent's 
brief. 
III. CONCLUSION 
Two facts are of crucial importance in dealing 
with respondent's argument that this suit is barred 
either by res judicata or by collateral estoppel. The 
-11-
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first is the fact that this is a tax litigation. The 
second is the fact that the Interconnect cases have, 
since 1974, brought about full economic competition in 
the sale of all types of telephone terminals and their 
related equipment. 
The fact that this is a tax suit dictates that 
respondent's res judicata argument must fail. Res judicata 
bars suit only on the same cause of action, but this suit 
involves a different tax enactment, a different tax period, 
and a different cause of action. 
Recognition of the fact that appellant had no 
direct competition at the time of the 1971 litigation be-
tween these parties, but has lost almost half its equip-
ment market to such competition between 1974 and 1976 
(R. 297-99) is crucial to the proper resolution of re-
spondent's collateral estoppel arguments. This dramatic 
change has been the result of a change, imposed by the 
Federal Communications Commission and the Federal Courts, 
in the law controlling the question of whether appellant 
would be permitted to continue to enjoy the freedom from 
competition which it had enjoyed throughout most of this 
century. That freedom from competition has been the 
basis for many court decisions, like the decision of this 
-12-
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Court in the 1971 Ogden City case supra, which have sus-
tained the validity of taxing public utility companies 
on a different basis from other businesses. The control!-
ing legal basis for those decisions has now changed. This 
change makes collateral estoppel imapplicable to this suit; 
it also makes the decision of the Third District Court unjust 
and legally unsound. 
RESPECTFULLY submitted this 1/( day of March, 
1979. 
I 
/ /L - ,~ 
David E. Salisbury 
Chris Wangsgard-' 
VANCOTT, BAGLEY, CO~~dALL & 
McCARTHY 
141 East First South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: 532-3333 
Attorneys for Appellant 
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APPENDIX I 
Authorities following the holding of Commissioner v. 
Sunnen 333 U.S. 591, 68 S. Ct. 715 (1948); 
First Circuit 
1973 
Fourth Circuit 
1955 
Fifth Circuit 
1967 
Seventh Circuit 
1974 
Ninth Circuit 
1966 
Tenth Circuit 
1975 
Court of Claims 
1977 
United States v. Felix Benitez 
Rexach, 482 F.2d 10 (lst Cir. 1973) 
Fairmont Aluminum Co. v. Commissioner 
of Internal Revenue, 222 F.2d 622 
(4th Cir. 1955) 
Mississippi River Fuel Corp. v. 
Roland Cocreharn, 382 F.2d 929 
(5th Cu. 1967) 
Frank C. Howard v. United States, 
497 F.2d 1270 (7th Cir. 1974) 
Southwest Exploration Co. v. Robert 
A. Riddell, 362 F.2d 833 (9th Cir. 
1966) 
Adolph Coors Co. v. Commissioner of 
Internal Revenue, 519 F.2d 1280 
(lOth Cir. 1975) 
Missouri Pacific Railroad Co. v. 
United States, 558 F.2d 596 (1977) 
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State Courts 
Arkansas, 1947 Missouri Pac. Hospital Ass'n 
v. Pulaski County, 199 SW.2d 329 
Arkansas, 1947 Clayton v. City of Little Rock, 
204 SW.2d 145 
Connecticut, 1975 Connecticut Light & Power Co. v. 
Tax Commlssioner, 362 A.2d 958, 
169 Conn. 58 
Connecticut, 1974 Joseph W. Pepin v. City of Danbury, 
368 A.2d 88, 171 Conn. 74 
Florida, 1973 Container Corp. of America v. Gene 
Long, 274 So. 2d 571 (Fla. A?P· 1973) 
Illinois, 1978 Hopedale Medical Foundation v. 
Tazewell County Collector, 375 NE.2d 1376 
Illinois, 1955 Oak Park Club v. Brenza, 131 NE.2d 
89, 7 lll 2d 389. 
Kentucky, 1948 German Gymnastic Ass'n of Louisville 
v. City of LOUlSVllle, 209 SW.2d 75, 
306 Ky. 810 
Kentucky, 1946 Louisville Garage Corp. v. City of 
LOUlSVllle, 198 SW.2d 40 
Minnesota, 1954 State v. P.K.M. Electric Co-Operative, 
65 N.W. 2d 871 
Missouri, 1951 Young Men's Christian Ass'n v. 
New Mexico, 1952 
New Mexico, 1950 
New York, 1963 
Sestric, 242 S.W. 2d 497 
Town of Atrisco v. Honohan, 240 
P.2d 216, 56 N.M. 70 
Albequerque Broadcasting Co. v. 
Bureau of Revenue, 216 P.2d 698, 
54 N.M. 165 
Town of Harrison v. County of 
Westchester, 196 N.E. 2d 240, 13 
N.Y.2d 258 
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State Courts 
New York, 196 3 
New York, 1955 
Oregon, 1977 
Harold E. Sundberg v. Joseph H. 
Murphy, 242 N.Y.S.2d 329 
People ex. rel. Watchtower Bible & 
Tract Soc1ety, Inc. v. Har1ng, 146 
N.Y.S.2d 151 286 App. D1v. 676 
Lethin v. De~t. of Revenue, 563 P.2d 
687, 278 Or. 201 
Pennsylvania, 1965 Appeal of Rieck Ice Cream Co., 209 
A.2d 383, 417 Pa. 249 
Tennessee, 1956 Roanes-Anderson Co. v. James Clarence 
Evans, Cornrn1ss1oner, etc., 292 S.\v.2d 
~ 
W. Virginia, 1955 Western Maryland Railway Co. v. 
Board of Publ1c >vorks, 90 S.E.2d 438 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby declare that I caused to be mailed a 
true and correct copy of the foregoing Reply Brief of 
Appellant in Case No. 16000, postage prepaid, this '/ 
day of March, 1979, to Roger F. Cutler, City Attorney, 
Attorney for Respondent, at 101 City & County Building, 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111. 
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